

**CORPORATE BOARD:
ROLE, DUTIES & COMPOSITION**

**СОВЕТ ДИРЕКТОРОВ: РОЛЬ,
ОБЯЗАННОСТИ И СОСТАВ**

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EDITORIAL

Dear readers!

This issue of the journal is devoted to several issues of corporate board practices.

Yi Wang, Antony Young, Sally Chaplin examine the determinants of board size and the consequence it has on the performance of large companies in Australia. In line with international and the prevalent United States research the results suggest that there is no significant relationship between board size and their subsequent performance. In examining whether more complex operations require larger boards it was found that larger firms or firms with more lines of business tended to have more directors. Data analysis from the research supports the proposition that blockholders could affect management practices and that they enhances performance as measured by shareholder return.

Themistokles Lazarides depicts the formulating factors of duality of roles in Greece. Literature has linked duality with performance, organizational stability, ownership concentration and balance of power and control within the firm. The paper, using a Probit regression analysis, examines whether these relationships are valid in Greece. Statistical – econometric analysis has shown that financial performance is not related with concentration of power and control. The same conclusion is can be drawn for ownership concentration. There is a trend of change but this trend hasn't the same dynamic or driving factors as the ones that are reported by Kirkbride and Letza (2002) and Muth and Donaldson (1998). The hypothesis posed by Heracleous (2001) and Baliga, Moyer and Rao (1996) are more likely to be true in the case of Greece. Overall, duality in Greece is affected by the historical development of the firm, its organizational scheme and even more by the balance of power and control within the firm.


Hasnah Kamardin, Hasnah Haron examine the extent of roles played by the board of directors (BOD) in Malaysian listed companies and the significant differences on the roles based on the company characteristics and board characteristics: firm size, leverage, growth, firm performance (ROA), family controlled companies, and CEO duality. Data are gathered from two sources whereby questionnaires are used to ascertain the extent of BOD participation in the board roles in the financial year 2006 and companies' annual reports are used to gather financial and board data. Using a sample of 112 companies, descriptive analysis shows that BOD mostly performs greater monitoring roles, other than performance evaluation. Strategy roles focus more on reviewing company's strategic plan and defining company's vision. Outside directors are required to focus on protecting shareholders' interests, provide a balanced view, and have strategic thinking capabilities. The results of t-test analysis indicate that to some extent the roles played by the BOD are significantly different in terms of firm size, firm performance and family companies. The results have some implications to the corporate governance practices.

Andrea Graf, Markus Stiglbauer tested the effect of board size on return on assets and return on equity. Our findings provide evidence that there is a significantly negative Management Board size effect both on return on assets and return on equity. The results are consistent with the assumption of dysfunctional norms of behaviour within the German two-tier board structure.

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